[GTER] Fwd: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco CSS 11000 Series Content Services Switches Malformed UDP Packet Vulnerability
Cristine Hoepers
cristine at nic.br
Thu Mar 4 14:28:35 -03 2004
----- Forwarded message from Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt at cisco.com> -----
From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt at cisco.com>
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco CSS 11000 Series Content Services Switches Malformed UDP Packet Vulnerability
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2004 9:1:26 -0800
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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco CSS 11000 Series Content Services Switches
Malformed UDP Packet Vulnerability
Revision 1
For Public Release 2004 March 4 at 1700 UTC (GMT)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents
Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Obtaining Fixed Software
Workarounds
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of This Notice: FINAL
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
The CSS 11000 Series Content Services Switches are vulnerable to a Denial
of Service (DoS) attack caused by malformed UDP packets received over the
management port.
This vulnerability is documented as Cisco bug ID CSCed45747. There is no
workaround available to mitigate the effects of this vulnerability. Cisco
is providing fixed software, and customers are recommended to upgrade to
it.
This advisory will be posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20040304-css.shtml.
Affected Products
The CSS 11000 Series Content Services Switches (formerly known as
Arrowpoint) consist of the CSS 11050, CSS 11150, and CSS 11800 hardware
platforms. They run the Cisco WebNS software.
+------------------------------------------+
| WebNS Release | Affected Releases |
| Train | |
|-----------------+------------------------|
|5.0(x) |earlier than |
| |05.0(04.07)S |
|-----------------+------------------------|
|6.10(x) |earlier than |
| |06.10(02.05)S |
+------------------------------------------+
For clarification, the CSS 11500 Series Content Services Switches
consisting of 11501, 11503, and 11506 , the Cisco Global Site Selector
(GSS) series switches, and the Content Switching Module (CSM) are not
affected by this vulnerability.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
To determine your hardware model and software revision, type show chassis
at the command line prompt.
Details
If malformed UDP packets are sent to UDP port 5002, the default port for
app-udp, on the management port of the CSS 11000 Series Content Services
Switch running Cisco WebNS release 5.0(x) and 6.10(x) release trains the
switch may reload. This vulnerability exists even when the Network
Proximity feature is not configured on the CSS 11000 Series Content
Services Switch. Please refer to
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/webscale/css/css_610/advcggd/proximty.htm
for more details on the Network Proximity feature.
Access to the management port of the CSS 11000 Series Content Services
Switches is available solely through the physical management interface on
the device; access via circuit VLANs is not implemented, and therefore the
vulnerability can only be exploited through the management port.
This vulnerability is documented in the Cisco Bug Toolkit (registered
customers only) as Bug ID CSCed45747. Cisco WebNS release 7.10(x),
7.20(x), and 7.30(x) release trains have also had code changes but due to
architectural differences they are not affected by this vulnerability.
The Internetworking Terms and Cisco Systems Acronyms online guides can be
found at http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/.
Impact
Exploitation of this vulnerability results in a reload of the CSS 11000
Series Content Services Switches. Repeated exploitation of the
vulnerability may result in a Denial of Service (DoS) for the CSS 11000
Series Content Services Switches.
Software Versions and Fixes
+------------------------------------------+
| WebNS Release | Fixed Releases |
| Train | |
|------------------+-----------------------|
|5.0(x) |05.0(04.07)S and later |
|------------------+-----------------------|
|6.10(x) |06.10(02.05)S and later|
+------------------------------------------+
The procedure to upgrade to the fixed software version is detailed at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/contnetw/ps789/products_administration_guide_chapter09186a0080176d04.html.
Obtaining Fixed Software
Cisco is offering free software upgrades to address this vulnerability for
all affected customers.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using
such software upgrades, Customers agree to be bound by the terms of
Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set
forth at the Cisco Connection Online Software Center at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at
http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/webns-interim?psrtdcat20e2. To
access the software download URL, you must be a registered user and you
must be logged in.
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through a prior
or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco
Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers, should contact that
support organization for assistance with obtaining the software
upgrade(s).
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors
but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of
sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC) using the contact information listed below. In
these cases, customers are entitled to obtain a free upgrade to a later
version of the same release or as indicated by the applicable corrected
software version in the Software Versions and Fixes section (noted above).
Cisco TAC contacts are as follows:
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac at cisco.com
See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for
additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone
numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a upgrade. Upgrades for
non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Please do not contact either "psirt at cisco.com" or
"security-alert at cisco.com" for software upgrades.
Workarounds
There is no workaround for this vulnerability. Customers may be able to
mitigate the affects of the vulnerability by controlling access to the UDP
port 5002 on the management port of the CSS 11000 Series Content Services
Switch to allow access only from required network devices or by
disallowing access if the Network Proximity feature is not configured.
The Cisco PSIRT recommends that affected users upgrade to a fixed software
version of code.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use
of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was reported to Cisco PSIRT by Timothy Arnold.
Status of This Notice: FINAL
This is a draft advisory. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy of
all statements in this advisory, all of the facts have been checked to the
best of our ability. Cisco does not anticipate issuing updated versions of
this advisory unless there is some material change in the facts. Should
there be a significant change in the facts, Cisco may update this
advisory.
A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory
that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual
errors.
Distribution
This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20040304-css.shtml.
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key having the fingerprint 8C82 5207
0CA9 ED40 1DD2 EE2A 7B31 A8CF 32B6 B590 and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce at cisco.com
* first-teams at first.org (includes CERT/CC)
* bugtraq at securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch at vulnwatch.org
* cisco at spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp at puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure at lists.netsys.com
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco at newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to
check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
+------------------------------------------+
|Revision 1 |2004 March 04 |Initial Release|
+------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to
receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide
website at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml. This
includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
This advisory is copyright 2004 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This advisory may
be redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the
text, provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified,
including all date and version information.
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