[GTER] CAIS-Alerta: Vulnerabilidade no protocolo TCP que afetam BGP
Liliana E. Velasquez Alegre Solha
nina at cais.rnp.br
Tue Apr 20 17:33:32 -03 2004
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2004 17:26:20 -0300 (BRST)
From: Centro de Atendimento a Incidentes de Seguranca <cais at cais.rnp.br>
To: rnp-alerta at cais.rnp.br, rnp-seg at cais.rnp.br
Subject: CAIS-Alerta: Vulnerabilidade no protocolo TCP que afetam BGP
Prezados,
O CAIS esta' repassando o alerta divulgado pelo NISCC (National
Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre) intitulado "NISCC
Vulnerability Advisory 236929 Vulnerability Issues in TCP", que descreve
uma vulnerabilidade que afeta implementacoes do protocolo TCP
(Transmission Control Protocol) em concordancia com as RFCs 793
(Transmission Control Protocol) e 1323 (TCP Extensions for High
Performance).
Se explorada, esta vulnerabilidade pode permitir que um atacante crie uma
condicao de Negacao de Servico (DoS) contra conexoes TCP existentes,
resultando no termino prematuro de sessoes e afetando a camada de
aplicacao.
O protocolo BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) e' considerado potencialmente
como o mais afetado por esta vulnerabilidade por contar com sessoes TCP
persistentes entre os pares BGP. Vale lembrar que o BGP e' o principal
protocolo de roteamento utilizado na internet hoje em dia.
O impacto mais serio disso e' que qualquer sessao BGP pode ser remotamente
resetada causando flaps nas sessoes BGP e consequentemente DUMP nas rotas
divulgadas.
Ainda de acordo com o alerta, ha tambem potencial de impacto em outros
protocolos de aplicacao, como DNS e SSL.
Sistemas afetados:
De acordo com o alerta, os seguintes fornecedores forneceram informacoes
sobre como seus produtos sao afetados por esta vulnerabilidade:
Os seguintes fornecedores disponibilizaram informacoes sobre como seus
produtos sao afetados por essa vulnerabilidade:
. Certicom
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm#certicom
. Check Point
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm#checkpoint
. Cisco
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm#cisco
. Cray Inc.
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm#cray
. Hitachi
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm#hitachi
. Innovaphone
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm#innovaphone
. Internet Initiative Japan, Inc
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm#iij
. InterNiche
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm#interniche
. Juniper Networks
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm#juniper
. NEC
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm#nec
. Polycom
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm#polycom
. Yamaha
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm#yamaha
Correcoes disponiveis:
No momento nao existem correcoes diponiveis, mas sim passos para se
mitigar o problema.
O CAIS recomenda que se procure informacoes diretamente com o fabricante
do produto em questao. Alem disso, o CAIS recomenda que os administradores
sigam as instrucoes para contornar o problema disponiveis no alerta do
NISCC.
Maiores informacoes:
. NISCC Vulnerability Advisory 236929 - Vulnerability Issues in TCP
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929
. RFC 2385 - Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2385.txt
Atenciosamente,
################################################################
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# Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa (RNP) #
# #
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National Infrastructure Security Co-Ordination Centre
NISCC Vulnerability Advisory 236929
Vulnerability Issues in TCP
Version Information
+-------------------------------------------+
| Advisory Reference | 236929 |
|------------------------+------------------|
| Release Date | 20 April 2004 |
|------------------------+------------------|
| Last Revision | 20 April 2004 |
|------------------------+------------------|
| Version Number | 1.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+
What is Affected?
The vulnerability described in this advisory affects implementations of
the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) that comply with the Internet
Engineering Task Force*s (IETF*s) Requests For Comments (RFCs) for TCP,
including RFC 793, the original specification, and RFC 1323, TCP
Extensions for High Performance.
TCP is a core network protocol used in the majority of networked computer
systems today. Many vendors include support for this protocol in their
products and may be impacted to varying degrees. Furthermore any network
service or application that relies on a TCP connection will also be
impacted, the severity depending primarily on the duration of the TCP
session.
Severity
The impact of this vulnerability varies by vendor and application, but in
some deployment scenarios it is rated critical. Please see the vendor
section below for further information. Alternatively contact your vendor
for product specific information.
If exploited, the vulnerability could allow an attacker to create a Denial
of Service condition against existing TCP connections, resulting in
premature session termination. The resulting session termination will
affect the application layer, the nature and severity of the effects being
dependent on the application layer protocol. The primary dependency is on
the duration of the TCP connection, with a further dependency on knowledge
of the network (IP) addresses of the end points of the TCP connection.
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is judged to be potentially most
affected by this vulnerability.
BGP relies on a persistent TCP session between BGP peers. Resetting the
connection can result in medium term unavailability due to the need to
rebuild routing tables and route flapping. Route flapping may result in
route dampening (suppression) if the route flaps occur frequently within a
short time interval. The overall impact on BGP is likely to be moderate
based on the likelihood of successful attack. If the TCP MD5 Signature
Option and anti-spoofing measures are used then the impact will be low as
these measures will successfully mitigate the vulnerability.
There is a potential impact on other application protocols such as DNS
(Domain Name System) and SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) in the case of zone
transfers and ecommerce transactions respectively, but the duration of the
sessions is relatively short and the sessions can be restarted without
medium term unavailability problems. In the case of SSL it may be
difficult to guess the source IP address.
Data injection may be possible. However, this has not been demonstrated
and appears to be problematic.
Summary
The issue described in this advisory is the practicability of resetting an
established TCP connection by sending suitable TCP packets with the RST
(Reset) or SYN (Synchronise) flags set.
The packets need to have source and destination IP addresses that match
the established connection as well as the same source and destination TCP
ports.
The fact that TCP sessions can be reset by sending suitable RST and SYN
packets is a design feature of TCP according to RFC 793, but a reset
attack is only possible at all because the source IP address and TCP port
can be forged or *spoofed*.
Although denial of service using crafted TCP packets is a well known
weakness of TCP, until recently it was believed that a successful denial
of service attack was not achievable in practice. The reason for this is
that the receiving TCP implementation checks the sequence number of the
RST or SYN packet, which is a 32 bit number, giving a probability of 1/232
of guessing the sequence number correctly (assuming a random
distribution).
The discoverer of the practicability of the RST attack was Paul A. Watson,
who describes his research in his paper *Slipping In The Window: TCP Reset
Attacks*, presented at the CanSecWest 2004 conference. He noticed that the
probability of guessing an acceptable sequence number is much higher than
1/232 because the receiving TCP implementation will accept any sequence
number in a certain range (or *window*) of the expected sequence number.
The window makes TCP reset attacks practicable.
Any application protocol which relies on long term TCP connections and for
which the source and destination IP addresses and TCP ports are known or
can be easily guessed will be vulnerable to at least denial of service
attacks.
Details
TCP is the transport layer protocol designed to provide
connection-oriented reliable delivery of IP packets. To do this TCP uses a
mixture of flags, to indicate state, and sequence numbers, to identify the
order in which the packets are to be reassembled.
TCP also provides a number, called an acknowledgement number, that is used
to indicate the sequence number of the next packet expected. The packets
are reassembled by the receiving TCP implementation only if their sequence
numbers fall within a range of the acknowledgement number (called a
"window"). The acknowledgement number is not used in a RST packet because
a reset does not expect a packet in return. (To be completely accurate,
although the last statement is true for a RST packet without the ACK flag
set, used to indicate that a TCP port is closed, a RST/ACK is used to
terminate an active connection in the event of error. In a RST/ACK packet
an acknowledgement number is included in the packet, although it is not
checked by the receiving TCP implementation.)
RFC 793, p36, states the following:
"In all states except SYN-SENT, all reset (RST) segments are validated by
checking their SEQ-fields [sequence numbers]. A reset is valid if its
sequence number is in the window. In the SYN-SENT state (a RST received in
response to an initial SYN), the RST is acceptable if the ACK field
acknowledges the SYN."
Resets must be processed immediately. RFC 793, p25, says "[*] [E]ven when
the receive window is zero, a TCP must process the RST and URG fields of
all incoming segments."
It is also possible to perform the same attack with SYN (synchronise)
packets. An established connection will abort by sending a RST if it
receives a duplicate SYN packet with initial sequence number within the
TCP window. RFC 793, p31 states:
*The principle reason for the three-way handshake is to prevent old
duplicate connection initiations from causing confusion. To deal with
this, a special control message, reset, has been devised. [*] If the TCP
is in one of the synchronized states (ESTABLISHED, FIN-WAIT-1, FIN-WAIT-2,
CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, LAST-ACK, TIME-WAIT), it aborts the connection and
informs its user.*
TCP window sizes are negotiated in the initial 3-way handshake used to set
up a TCP connection, with higher values serving to improve throughput in
some circumstances. Vendor-chosen defaults also influence the selection.
In any case, the larger the window size, the greater is the probability
that a randomly chosen TCP sequence number will lie within the window
range. This is the basis for the attack.
A TCP connection is defined by a 4-tuple comprising source and destination
IP addresses, and source and destination ports. An attacker seeking to
disrupt an existing TCP connection must supply the 4-tuple correctly. As
the source port varies, additional work is generally called for on the
part of the attacker. However, research (referenced below) has shown that
the process of source port selection on many platforms includes
predictable elements, so that the attack remains practicable. By weighting
'likely' source port values carefully, an attacker can disrupt TCP
implementations that employ a range of window sizes.
Application layer protocols that are critically affected are those that:
* Depend on long lived TCP connections
* Have known or easy-to-guess IP address end points
* Have easy to an easy-to-guess source TCP port
As noted above BGP does use long lived TCP connections, and the IP
addresses and source port (and destination port) are sometimes available
through the use of BGP looking glasses (multi-source, multi-destination
trace route tools) or DNS resource records. Using *trace route* commands
can provide information on peering point IP addresses. Thus BGP is likely
to be critically affected by the TCP vulnerability.
These denial of service attacks can be carried out by single machine, or
by multiple co-operating systems (to form a distributed denial of service
attack).
It is also possible to inject packets, which will be processed if they are
in the window. The difficulty with data injection attacks is that the
receiving TCP implementation will reassemble the packets received
according to sequence number, dropping any duplicate packets.
Vendor specific information will be released as it becomes available and
if vendor permission has been received. Subscribers are advised to check
the following URL regularly for updates:
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/236929/index.htm
[Please note that updates to this advisory will not be notified by email.]
This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE name CAN-2004-0230.
The Open Source Vulnerability Database ID number for this vulnerability is
4030.
Mitigation
The following mitigation steps are still being evaluated and may be
incomplete. Customers should work with vendors for the workaround most
appropriate for the product in question.
In the absence of vendor patching of the TCP implementation, the following
are general mitigating steps:
* Implement IP Security (IPSEC) which will encrypt traffic at the
network layer, so TCP information will not be visible
* Reduce the TCP window size (although this could increase traffic loss
and subsequent retransmission)
* Do not publish TCP source port information
It should be noted that IPSEC provides confidentiality and authentication
services at the network layer, and can provide a measure of trust in the
authenticity of the end points as well as encryption of traffic between
the end points. However, in the context of the current attack IPSEC will
reject RST and SYN packets that are not part of a secure IP packet stream.
To change the TCP window size, in some Unix variants you can set a value
of the default TCP windows size by using the *sysctl* program (*ndd -set*
in the case of Sun Solaris). In the case of Microsoft Windows
NT/2000/XP/2003, the default window size can be changed by modifying the
value of the
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters key.
As noted above, great care should be exercised when altering the default
TCP window size as network performance could be adversely affected.
In the case of BGP, the following may counter the problem:
* Implement ingress and egress filtering to check that the traffic
entering or leaving the network has a source IP address that is
expected on the router/firewall interface that receives the traffic
* Implement the TCP MD5 Signature Option to checksum the TCP packet
carrying the BGP application data (see RFC 2385), being careful to
set and maintain strong (i.e. difficult to guess) passwords to which
the MD5 checksum is applied. Also see RFC 3562 which discusses the
security requirements of this keying material.
* Limit the amount of information available through looking glasses and
DNS resource records, being careful not to expose TCP port
information unnecessarily
The IETF ingress filtering standard is defined in RFC 2827. A discussion
of egress filtering can be found at http://www.sans.org/y2k/egress.htm.
The use of the TCP MD5 Signature Option will prevent the exploitation of
this vulnerability. Router customers should implement this on all BGP
peering points if it is supported by the router, upgrading the router
firmware if necessary.
Solution
Please refer to the Vendor Information section of this advisory for
implementation specific remediation.
Some vendors will have reduced the likelihood of successful denial of
service by amending the TCP implementation to issue a further
acknowledgment packet challenge for RST and SYN packets that do not have
exactly the expected sequence number.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has published an Internet Draft
to co-incide with the release of this advisory. The text of this draft is
available from the IETF web site:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-00.txt
NISCC has produced best practice guidelines for BGP available at
http://www.niscc.gov.uk/BGP Filtering Guide.pdf
Secure configuration templates for BGP implementations on Cisco IOS and
Juniper JunOS can be found at:
* Cisco http://www.cymru.com/Documents/secure-bgp-template.html
* Juniper http://www.qorbit.net/documents/junos-bgp-template.pdf
Guidance on tuning of the IP stack for a number of different UNIX
operating systems is available at
http://www.cymru.com/Documents/ip-stack-tuning.html
Vendor Information
The following vendors have provided information about how their products
are affected by these vulnerabilities.
Please note that JPCERT/CC have released a Japanese language advisory for
this vulnerability which contains additional information regarding
Japanese vendors. This advisory is available at
http://www.jpcert.or.jp/at/2004/at040003.txt.
Certicom Internet Initiative Japan, Inc
Check Point InterNiche
Cisco Juniper Networks
Cray Inc NEC
Hitachi Polycom
Innovaphone Yamaha
Certicom
Certicom's SSL software developer toolkits (SDK), requires a
transport mechanism, however it is not restricted to TCP. The default
implementation that is shipped with the product utilizes the
supported operating system's TCP/IP stack. Certicom recognizes that
the indicated vulnerability is against the protocol stack itself and
not directly the application on top. As our products (SSL Plus, SSL
Plus for Java, Security Builder SSL-C, and Security Builder SSL-J),
are primarily used in a web server environment, a denial of service
attack is important to us and our customers. As there is no patch or
workaround that Certicom can implement within our products, we feel
that we are not directly vulnerable to this advisory. Certicom's
website is www.certicom.com.
Check Point
The latest release for VPN-1/FireWall-1 (R55 HFA-03) contains a
protection against this vulnerability. The protection applies to
both the firewall device and to hosts behind the firewall.
Please refer to the Check Point web site for further information at:
http://www.checkpoint.com/techsupport/alerts/tcp_dos.html.
Cisco
Place holder.
Cray Inc
Cray Inc. is vulnerable on their UNICOS, UNICOS/mk and UNICOS/mp
systems. Spr's have been opened to track this issue. Please contact
your local Cray Service Representative for more information.
Hitachi
Hitachi is investigating the potential impact to Hitachi's products.
Innovaphone
Not vulnerable.
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc (IIJ)
IIJ will release a new firmware to fix this vulnerability. Details
are available on their web site at
http://www.seil.jp/en/ann/announce_en_20040421_01.txt.
InterNiche
=== NicheStack v2.0 TCP/IP ===
InterNiche Technologies has updated its NicheStack v2.0 TCP/IP
product to handle the scenarios described in NISCC Vulnerability
Notice #236929. The patch is available to all InterNiche customers
in accordance with the terms of their current support agreements.
More information can be found on www.iNiche.com or through
support at iNiche.com
=== NicheLite v2.0 TCP/IP ===
InterNiche Technologies has updated its NicheLite v2.0 TCP/IP product
to handle the scenarios described in NISCC Vulnerability Notice
#236929. The patch is available to all InterNiche customers in
accordance with the terms of their current support agreements.
More information can be found on www.iNiche.com or through
support at iNiche.com
Juniper Networks
Juniper Networks products are susceptible to this vulnerability.
Software is available that implements several mechanisms to mitigate
the associated risks. Customers should contact Juniper Networks
Technical Assistance Center for availability and download
instructions.
Additional information is posted on our web site at
https://www.juniper.net/support.
NEC
NEC is aware of this vulnerability and is trying to determine
potential impacts on our products.
Polycom
Polycom has investigated the potential impact to our products for
NISCC Advisory 236929.
Specific product information will be provided at
http://www.polycom.com/securitycenter.
Yamaha
Pending.
Acknowledgements
NISCC wishes to thank the following:
* Steve Bellovin, Rob Thomas and Paul Watson for their contributions to
this advisory.
* Cisco Systems Inc. and Juniper Networks Inc. for their help with the
content of this advisory and for their support during the disclosure
process.
* JPCERT/CC for their assistance in co-ordinating this disclosure in
Japan.
Contact Information
The NISCC Vulnerability Management Team can be contacted as follows:
+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Email | vulteam at niscc.gov.uk |
| | (Please quote the advisory reference in the |
| | subject line.) |
|-----------+--------------------------------------------------|
| Telephone | +44 (0)20 7821 1330 Extension 4511 |
| | (Monday to Friday 08:30 - 17:00) |
|-----------+--------------------------------------------------|
| Fax | +44 (0)20 7821 1686 |
|-----------+--------------------------------------------------|
| Post | Vulnerability Management Team |
| | NISCC |
| | PO Box 832 |
| | London |
| | SW1P 1BG |
+--------------------------------------------------------------+
We encourage those who wish to communicate via email to make use of our
PGP key. This is available from http://www.uniras.gov.uk/UNIRAS.asc.
Please note that UK government protectively marked material should not be
sent to the email address above.
If you wish to be added to our email distribution list, please email your
request to uniras at niscc.gov.uk.
What is NISCC?
For further information regarding the UK National Infrastructure Security
Co-Ordination Centre, please visit the NISCC web site at:
http://www.niscc.gov.uk/aboutniscc/index.htm
Reference to any specific commercial product, process or service by trade
name, trademark manufacturer or otherwise, does not constitute or imply
its endorsement, recommendation, or favouring by NISCC. The views and
opinions of authors expressed within this notice shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.
Neither shall NISCC accept responsibility for any errors or omissions
contained within this advisory. In particular, they shall not be liable
for any loss or damage whatsoever, arising from or in connection with the
usage of information contained within this notice.
(c) 2004 Crown Copyright
Revision History
April 20, 2004: Initial release (1.0)
<End of NISCC Vulnerability Advisory>
------------ Output from pgp ------------
Pretty Good Privacy(tm) Version 6.5.8
(c) 1999 Network Associates Inc.
Uses the RSAREF(tm) Toolkit, which is copyright RSA Data Security, Inc.
Export of this software may be restricted by the U.S. government.
File is signed. Good signature from user "Centro de Atendimento a Incidentes de Seguranca <cais at cais.rnp.br>".
Signature made 2004/04/20 20:27 GMT
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