[caiu] Problemas DNSSEC para e-mail
Rubens Kuhl
rubensk em gmail.com
Sáb Jul 15 10:13:50 BRT 2017
Dos 6 domínios com mais envio de e-mails e que tem problemas com DNSSEC
e/ou TLSA DANE, 5 são brasileiros:
rzd.rutse.jus.brtiviths.com.brtrt1.jus.brtrtrj.jus.brtjce.jus.br
Outros 3 domínios aparentemente brasileiros mas com menor volume de
mensagens são:
catabra.com.br
server29.prazernavida.com
mail.pgp.inf.br
Fonte: https://mail.sys4.de/pipermail/dane-users/2017-May/000411.html
(reproduzido ao final)
Alguém com contatos nessas organizações ?
Rubens
Update on stats 2017-05*Viktor Dukhovni* ietf-dane at dukhovni.org
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*Sun May 28 21:05:31 CEST 2017*
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As of today I count 169812 domains with correct DANE TLSA records
for SMTP. As expected the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted the
handful of DNS/hosting providers who've enabled DANE support in
bulk for the domains they host. The top 10 MX host providers by
domain count are:
69614 domeneshop.no
59404 transip.nl
18372 udmedia.de
6733 bhosted.nl
1831 nederhost.net
997 ec-elements.com
501 core-networks.de
339 bit.nl
334 omc-mail.com
309 uvt.nl
[ The 365 "networking4all.net" domains from last month are
gone, because they got bought by metaregistrar.nl and the
new MX hosts are not in DNSSEC signed zones. Otherwise,
the total would now have been over 170000. ]
The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to
the full zone data for most ccTLDs, especially .no/.nl/.de.
There are 2567 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are
found, this counts each of the above providers as just one zone,
so is a measure of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers
deployed. Alternatively, a similar number is seen in the count
(2667) of distinct MX host server certificates that support the
same ~169000 domains.
A related number is 3818 TLSA RRsets found for MX host TCP port
25. This includes secondary MX hosts and domains none of whose
primary MX hosts have TLSA records.
The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's
email transparency report is 108 (this is my ad-hoc criterion for
a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain). Of
these, 54 are in recent reports:
anubisnetworks.com gmx.de posteo.de
asf.com.pt gmx.net registro.br
asp4all.nl hr-manager.net ruhr-uni-bochum.de
bayern.de ietf.org samba.org
bhosted.nl isc.org solvinity.com
bund.de jpberlin.de t-2.com
comcast.net lrz.de t-2.net
dd24.net mail.com t-2.si
debian.org mail.de torproject.org
domeneshop.no netbsd.org trashmail.com
elster.de nic.br tum.de
enron.email nic.cz uni-erlangen.de
fau.de octopuce.fr unitymedia.de
freebsd.org open.ch web.de
gentoo.org openssl.org webcruitermail.no
gmx.at ouderportaal.nl xfinity.com
gmx.ch overheid.nl xs4all.net
gmx.com pathe.nl xs4all.nl
Of the ~169000 domains, 749 have "partial" TLSA records, that cover
only a subset of the MX hosts. While this protects traffic to some
of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable to the usual
active attacks via the remaining MX hosts.
The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to
advertise STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands
today at 93. The list of the 54 underlying MX hosts that serve
these domains and whose TLSA records don't match reality.
Hall of Shame:
mail.dipietro.id.au mail.enzevalos.de dorothy.goldenhairdafo.ne
eumembers.stansoft.bg hmserver.de hs.kuzenkov.net
catabra.com.br mail.manima.de oostergo.net
server29.prazernavida.com www.mtg.de ren.warunek.net
mail.pgp.inf.br mx1.spamsponge.de cinnamon.nl
my.mai1.ch mail.0pc.eu mail.e-rave.nl
alpaca.attackllama.com gamepixel.eu mail.jekuiken.nl
mail.danmolik.com mx.quentindavid.fr mail.myzt.nl
mail.digitalwebpros.com servmail.fr bounder.steelyard.nl
demo.liveconfig.com mail.nonoserver.info mx.wm.net.nz
ny-do.pieterpottie.com mx.datenknoten.me beerstra.org
diablo.sgt.com mx.giesen.me smtp.copi.org
tusk.sgt.com smtp.aechelon.net eumembers.datacentrix.org
mx1.wittsend.com mail.castleturing.net smtp3.amadigi.ovh
mx.bels.cz mail.d3fy.net mail.pasion.ro
gaia.nfx.cz datawebb.dafcorp.net mail.lahl.rocks
badf00d.de anubis.delphij.net protector.rajmax.si
mail.denniseffing.de goldenhairdafo.net email.themcintyres.us
The number of domains with bad DNSSEC support is 438. The increase is
due to a comprehensive scan of all 4.6 million DNSSEC domains in the
survey, previously some parts of the survey did not record SERVFAIL
results.
the top 10 DNS providers with problem domains are:
68 jsr-it.nl
58 infracom.nl - Was slated to be resolved in March, delayed...
27 is.nl
24 active24.cz
23 tiscomhosting.nl
18 metaregistrar.nl
15 rdw.nl
10 firstfind.nl
9 cas-com.net
8 loopia.se
Around 50 of the broken domains have at least one working nameserver,
and so are email-reachable, given enough retries. Only 6 of these
DNS-broken domains appear in historical Google Email transparency
reports:
rzd.ru
tse.jus.br
tiviths.com.br
trt1.jus.br
trtrj.jus.br
tjce.jus.br
The associated DNS lookup issues are:
_25._tcp.ims1.rzd.ru. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response:
http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.ims1.rzd.ru/dnssec/
_25._tcp.ims2.rzd.ru. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response:
http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.ims2.rzd.ru/dnssec/
_25._tcp.lalavava.tse.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response:
http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.lalavava.tse.jus.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.mx.tiviths.com.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response:
http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx.tiviths.com.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.mx1.trt1.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; zone signature failure:
http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx1.trt1.jus.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.mx1.trtrj.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; zone signature failure:
http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx1.trtrj.jus.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.mx2.tjce.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; SOA signature failure:
http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx2.tjce.jus.br/dnssec/
[ See <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-no-response-issue-08>,
Much of the TLSA non-response issue seems to be related to a
"feature" of Arbor Networks firewalls, that enables droping
of DNS requests for all but the most common RRtypes. Do not
make the mistake of enabling this firewall "feature". ]
The oldest outstanding DNS issue is another SOA signature issue
at truman.edu dating back to Nov/2014:
http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.barracuda.truman.edu/VGzORw/dnssec/
I hope some day soon they'll start missing email they care about
and take the time to resolve the problem.
--
Viktor.
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